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1.  Introduction 
Adaptive preferences are preferences formed in response to circumstances and opportunities 
– paradigmatically, they occur when we scale back our desires so they accord with what is 
probable or at least possible. While few commentators are willing to wholly reject the 
normative significance of such preferences, adaptive preferences have nevertheless attracted 
substantial criticism in recent political theory. The groundbreaking analysis of Jon Elster 
charged that such preferences are not autonomous, and several other commentators have 
since followed Elster’s lead. On a second front, capability theorists Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen have objected that adaptive preferences lead people away from objective goods 
and constitute an impediment to progressive change in developing countries. In this paper I 
argue that the criticisms of Elster, Sen and Nussbaum fail on the one hand to take into 
account what may be positively said in favour of this type of preference formation, and fail 
on the other hand to distinguish between different types of psychological changes – with the 
result that many of the critiques offered have a narrower purview than is currently allowed. 
My analysis of adaptive preferences, even in their most ideal form, is however not entirely 
positive; I adduce reasons why we can be cautious about allowing adaptive preferences to 
play certain types of roles in political processes, even as we accept those very preferences as 
normative and autonomous for the agent holding them. 
The argument begins in Section Two by distinguishing five separate mechanisms by which a 
person may come to change the content or nature of their preferences. In Section Three I 
argue that one of these – ‘Hellenistic Adaptation’ – is uniquely justified. This argument is 
founded on the three bases of happiness, objective value and autonomy. In Section Four I 
consider some of the objections to adaptive preferences in the literature, and before in Section 
Five sketching some consequences of this argument for contemporary political theory. 
2. Mechanisms of change to the content or nature of preferences  
There are many ways a person’s preferences and motivations for action can alter according to 
their circumstances. In this section I distinguish five key mechanisms of such psychological 
change. This list is not exhaustive. For instance, I pass over, (i) adaptations to situations that 
change the amount of felt-satisfaction without altering preferences as such, (ii) the oft-noted 
continual expansion of aspirations where we strive for ever-greater achievements (Teschl and 
Comim, 2005, pp. 237-40), and, (iii) the way we learn about the joys and satisfactions 
internal to certain practices and activities by experiencing them (Brucker, 2009, p. 312; 
Elster, 1983, pp. 112-13).  
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1. Preference- or Action-Targeting Moral Obloquy: ‘I desire δ, but I recognize that such a 
desire, or the action precipitated by it, is morally wrong.’ If we become convinced, by 
argument, indoctrination, religious decree, socialization or some other process that a 
particular action (or the desire to perform that action) is morally wrong, then that alters the 
way that preference works in our decision-making (Walker, 1995, p. 459). We still hold the 
preference – but we resist on moral grounds it giving us reasons for action.1  
2. Resignation: Learned Helplessness and Learned Worthlessness: ‘I desire δ, but my 
happiness, and my preferences, for δ or anything else, are insignificant. They constitute no 
reason for anyone to act.’ There are two ways a person can come to detach their preferences 
from having any role in action-formation, either theirs or others. The first is ‘learned 
helplessness’. From experience we learn that nothing we do alters our situation for the better 
and so we come to detach our preferences from their normal role of motivating actions 
(Teschl and Comim, 2005, p. 238). Our response to this conditioning process is one of 
learned passivity – we are not happy, but we have come to fatalistically resign ourselves to 
the grim fact that our happiness is impossible and inconsequential. This resignation may also 
arise from learned worthlessness. Learned worthlessness can occur through relentless assaults 
on our self-esteem or through direct moral indoctrination. In the latter case, we are taught or 
socialised into an ethical system where our desires and happiness do not morally count; they 
constitute no reasons for anyone to act. While I follow the psychological literature in terming 
these responses ‘learned’, connotations of heuristic activity, pro-activeness and deliberateness 
are not apposite. ‘Learned’ here is used in the narrow sense of conditioned.  
3. Hellenistic Adaptation: ‘Holding a desire for δ was not, given my situation and 
capabilities, conducive to my happiness, so I have changed my preferences to no longer 
desire δ.’ In this case, a particular preference is found to be unlikely to lead to personal 
happiness. This is because its chance of successful fulfilment is too low – to retain the 
preference is to want what we cannot get.  This low chance of fulfilment may be combined 
with high costs of pursuit; the time, resources and effort invested are judged not to be worth 
it. The name I use derives from the foundational insight shared by the two main ethical 
theories developed in the Hellenistic period, Stoicism and Epicureanism. Though they each 
took the insight to different conclusions, both these ethical traditions began with the 
realization that happiness is closely related to having fulfilled preferences. For this reason, 
having preferences that are not likely to be fulfilled, or that can be fulfilled only at substantial 
cost to other important preferences, is unwise (Cicero, 1883, 1:19; Mitsis, 1988, p. 1). Such 
desires are an impediment to what the Hellenistic philosophers held to be the most important 
thing for any person, their own happiness.  
While I will flesh out this process of Hellenistic Adaptation in the following section, two 
points deserve note here. First, the agent’s preferences must change. The agent is not merely 
choosing to act for  rather than for δ on the basis of the high costs and low likelihood of 
achieving δ – they are coming to no longer prefer δ at all. Second, as I will understand it, the 
process can be anything from meticulously deliberate to largely unconscious. At minimum, 
the agent needs to be aware on some level that their pursuit of the desired object δ is not 
meeting with success. Moreover, they are dissatisfied with this situation and they have no 
reason to expect improvement in the future. But I will count it as Hellenistic Adaptation even 
if their preference for δ comes to be diminished without their consciously reflecting that their 
desire for δ is making them frustrated and that they would be happier without it, and a fortiori 
without their engaging on a deliberate regimen (as the Stoics envisaged) for ridding 
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themselves of the preference. Of course, most instances of Hellenistic Adaptation fall 
between these extremes – we might do no more than tell ourselves to ‘get over’ our pointless 
infatuation with a previous lover, or we recognize the wisdom when we are told to ‘love the 
one you’re with’.  
4. Sour Grapes: ‘I could not have δ, and so I have come to hold that δ is not desirable.’ In the 
fable of the fox and the grapes it is insufficiently noted that the fox goes beyond mere 
Hellenistic Adaptation (e.g. Elster, pp. 219-220). As Brucker (2007, p. 320) observes, the 
source of the fox’s obvious irrationality is that he comes to a belief that is presumably false 
and is plainly not substantiated by any evidence he has: those grapes are sour. The fox 
moves from his incapacity to possess δ not merely to the view that he would do well not to 
desire those grapes, but to the view that those grapes are such as would not be desirable to 
anyone. This is a form of irrationality of belief formation; if it is an indispensable property of 
beliefs that they aim at truth, then the fox is being irrational and self-deceiving by coming to 
form a belief on the basis of reasons that have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of that 
belief. (It is possible that even non-evaluative descriptive beliefs may change on some such 
basis: see Sunstein, 1991, p. 21.) If Hellenistic Adaptation is the changing of our preferences 
to cohere with the demands of reality as we understand it, then Sour Grapes irrationality is 
the changing of our understanding of reality in order to cohere with our preferences.   
5. Negative cognitive habituation and emotional besmirching: ‘Every time I consider 
unattainable object δ I feel distaste and think about nothing but its defects’. It has proven a 
challenge for commentators to pin down exactly what Elster has in mind as his target in his 
influential work on sour grapes (e.g. Baber, 2007, p. 112). But I think we can give an account 
of the type of psychological change at work in Elster’s examples that explains, a) why the 
acquired affective state is swiftly reversible, b) why Elster speaks of the change as 
‘habituation’, c) why it tends to be negative – rejecting what we couldn’t have, rather than 
loving what we can, and, d) why it tends to ‘overshoot’, giving us a stronger response than 
seems rationally called for (Elster, 1983, pp. 110-124). What is at work here, I think, is a 
colouring of mood and habituation of thought. Emotionally, we work up a state of dislike, 
hatred, disgust, resentment or scorn (perhaps fueled by our incapacity to attain the object) and 
we direct it at the unattainable object itself. We smear it internally with ugly emotive 
connotations. Cognitively, we develop a habit of stressing its defects to ourselves whenever 
we consider it (Elster, 1983, p. 119). In this way, we mentally paper over the genuine desire 
that remains for the object – we unconsciously manufacture a single-minded antipathy, 
perhaps going far beyond what is sensible for our own happiness and tranquility. We don’t 
stop loving it, we just respond psychologically as if we hated it. However, if the object – a 
lover, a promotion, the grapes – suddenly becomes available, it is easy enough to cast off the 
emotional patina and confess to ourselves that we always really desired it. 
In the following section I will marshal arguments for the reasonableness of Hellenistic 
Adaptation, and so of the normative significance of preferences formed on its basis. In 
Section Three I will argue that most of the key concerns raised against adaptive preferences 
are, upon examination, worries about one or other of the remaining psychological 
mechanisms described above. 
3. Reasons in favor of Hellenistic Adaptation 
Though in the literature on adaptive preferences Hellenistic Adaptation is not specifically 
distinguished, there is nevertheless a general awareness that some such process can be good 
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for the agent.2 Here I offer three types of reasons why Hellenistic Adaptation is significant – 
on the basis of happiness, objective value and autonomy. 
3.1 Hellenistic Adaptation and Felt-Happiness 
The most fundamental reason for changing our unlikely-to-ever-be-fulfilled-preference is 
simply that we will be happier when we have done so. The very foundation of a life of 
happiness, as John Stuart Mill drew it out of antiquity, was ‘not to expect more from life than 
it is capable of bestowing’ (2001, p. 13). There are four ways happiness might be sundered by 
unrealistic preferences. 
First, and most obvious, there is the pain of disappointment. When we desire some object, 
and act to gain it, we are inevitably disappointed and frustrated if we fail to obtain it. As the 
Stoic Epictetus put it: 
following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and 
aversion promises the avoiding [of] that to which you are averse. However, he who 
fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of 
his aversion wretched… if you desire any of the things which are not in your own 
control, you must necessarily be disappointed.3  
The conclusion is evident. Desiring what we cannot have sets us up for disappointment and 
frustration. An agent wisely pursuing her own happiness will therefore seek to diminish or 
dissolve such desires and so to have – as Phillip Mitsis describes Epicurus’ prescription – her 
‘scope of satisfactions expand and contract to adjust to individual circumstances’ (1988, p. 
51, pp. 118-27). 
Second, there is the unpleasing array of emotions a person feels when they desire something 
they know is not within their power to achieve. When we are aware that what we desire is a 
hostage to fortune we experience negative emotions like fear, stress and perturbation.4 
Contrariwise, someone who has no desires for things she cannot obtain experiences other 
goods – she sees herself as in control, strong and unconquerable (Epictetus, 1758, [2]; Cicero, 
1883, 1:12; Smith, 2006, pp. 48-55). Epicurus famously added to our happiness-based 
worries about fear and distress by arguing there is a distinct form of pleasure achieved by the 
person who is not disturbed by stresses or fears for the future: tranquility. Tranquility arises 
not from actively fulfilling preferences, but from the pleasant state of having no outstanding 
preferences of the sort that give rise to the uncomfortable ‘tempest of the soul’.5  
Third, as Epicurus further argued, at least some wants are undesirable simply in terms of the 
experience of having them (1957a, pp. 31-2). The experience of want can be itself a type of 
pain; it is an itch that, until scratched, is a discomfort. As Epicurus saw it – and surely this 
holds for at least some preferences – we must fulfil the want just to ease its unpleasant 
demand and so to return to our prior emotional state. For wants that have little chance of 
fulfilment, we experience the dissatisfaction of felt desire without even the prospect of swift 
fulfilment.  
Fourth, there is disharmony caused by desiring things that we consistently fail to obtain. 
Pursuing the impossible has material, emotional and life costs, and awareness of these costs 
creates conflicts and temptations in our decision-making. Desires incapable of satisfaction 
‘quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life 
embittered’ (Cicero, 1883, 1:13).  
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For all these reasons, ceteris paribus, a person acts wisely – rationally pursues their happiness 
– when they rid themselves of preferences that they are unable to achieve. 
3.2 Hellenistic Adaptation and the Good Life 
It is often supposed that Hellenistic Adaptation loses some of its luster if we suppose that 
there exists an objectively good life for humans (e.g. Brucker, 2009, p. 321). After all, 
Hellenistic Adaptation is performed in the face of external circumstances, and the fact that we 
cannot achieve something seems poor evidence for its not, in fact, being a worthwhile 
pursuit. As we will see later (§4, §5.2), there is something to be said for this concern. But 
here I want to illustrate three links between Hellenistic Adaptation and objective goods, and 
to deflect one major worry. 
First, objective human goods are goods that will be in some deep sense linked with human 
capacities. As Nussbaum herself notes, our acceptance that we cannot fly as we might have 
wished when we were children is doubtless an adaptive preference, and we are better for the 
having of it (2001, p. 78). Flying is, reasonably, not a basic human good, and when we 
respond to limitations we share with the rest of our species, we are not moving away from 
plausible lists of objective human goods, but towards them. Another way of putting this point 
is that values – even objective values – might best be understood as meeting places between a 
person’s will and the world around them. True human goods are not out of touch with reality 
and human capacities – and Hellenistic Adaptation is the process that brings ideals into 
alignment with reality.  
Second, as I noted in §2, there are some types of situations to which the human response is 
not Hellenistic Adaptation but rather learned helplessness: a fatalistic resignation that our 
preferences are not, in fact, important. If so, then the fact that people cannot adapt their 
preferences in the face of widespread powerlessness, as they can adapt to other grim 
circumstances, seems to hint at the possibility that the need for control over some facets of 
our life is an imprescriptible interest of every person. As Veenhoven puts it: ‘in contrast to 
“wants”, “needs” are not relative. Needs are absolute demands for human functioning, which 
do not adjust to any and all conditions; in fact, they mark the limits of human adaptability’ 
(2007, p. 258). This outcome might well be welcomed by Capability Theorists like 
Nussbaum. Charting the limits of preference adaptation might help us draw a line between 
capability-based needs and other less fundamental wants. At minimum, we might think, 
objective human goods must include those interests and capacities where attempts at 
preference-adaptation fail, and other psychological defense-mechanisms step in. 
Third, Hellenistic Adaptation will often occasion reflection. By feeling the high costs and low 
successes accompanying some desire, we are prompted to consider whether holding that 
desire is worth it. At least in some cases, this consideration will involve trying to gauge what 
really is worthwhile in human life – that is, into what ends are valuable. In this way the 
Hellenistic Insight can prompt us to reflect upon what is objectively good for human beings. 
Now for the worry I wish to deflect. It might be thought that Hellenistic Adaptation will 
make life small and mediocre – that it will strip human existence of its richness and fullness. 
It is true enough that there will be times Hellenistic Adaptation will prompt ask us to reflect 
on precisely how rich and full – how complicated and busy – we want our lives to be. But 
two Stoic points bear notice here. First, Hellenistic Adaptation does not require we give up 
those dreams that require great labor and fortitude. We can still wish to be everything that we 
can be – we just should avoid trying to be more than that. But more importantly second, 
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Hellenistic Adaptation directs us to focus on the joys inherent in our journey – in the life that 
is lived in pursuit of some goal, rather than attaining the goal itself. The Stoics acted and 
strived in the world – but they located their excellences and joys in that action and striving 
(Epictetus, 1758, [1], [10], [17]; Aurelius, 2006, pp. 19, 28; Long, 2006, p. 388). They did not 
let the entirety of their happiness rest upon the question of whether they succeeded in this or 
that endeavor. The success was in undertaking and acting well in the endeavor itself – and 
that success fate could not steal from them.  
If these points are well-founded, then Hellenistic Adaptation need not occasion either a 
distortion or an abandoning of the true human good life, but rather a route to understanding 
and embracing it.  
3.3 Hellenistic Adaptation and Autonomy  
The central objection to adaptive preferences introduced by Jon Elster in his influential work 
on sour grapes was that such preferences are not autonomous. That is, adaptive preferences 
are formed as a result of factors external to the agent, and are thus not ends that the agent has 
set themselves (Elster, 1982; Sunstein, 1991, p. 11). Now it bears immediate notice that 
merely because a preference is not autonomous does not ipso facto mean it is insignificant. 
Suppose, for example, that an adult, Amy, has a preference for playing tennis. This 
preference, however, was formed through the exploitative actions of her parents. Her parents 
envisioned making a fortune through Amy’s athletic talents, and coerced the child Amy into 
relentless practice. Now grown up and freed from their yoke, Amy still loves to play tennis. 
She enjoys the exercise, the competitiveness, and her excellence at and knowledge of the 
game. And she would count it as a real and deep loss to her life if this pursuit was forbidden 
to her. In such a case, it would be a genuine harm to Amy to prevent her from engaging in 
this preferred activity. As such, respecting Amy might require we respect her current 
preference irrespective of its exploitative provenance (Brucker, 2009, p. 316; Walker, 1995, 
p. 464). So much is only to point out that attributions of autonomy are not decisive in settling 
whether we should respect a person’s preferences. But it is consistent with this point to think 
that autonomy is of profound normative importance, and in the remains of this section I 
marshal three reasons why Hellenistic Adaptation can be a move towards, or at least in line 
with, one’s autonomy. 
First, Elster acknowledged one exception to his judgment about autonomy and adaptive 
preferences. When the mechanism creating the change in preferences was an intentional 
process of shaping – the Stoic regimen being the prime example – then autonomy was 
possible (Elster, 1983, pp. 224, 227). The reasoning here is straightforward enough. If 
autonomy is the setting of one’s own ends, then any process – like Hellenistic Adaptation – 
that has a person reflecting upon their ends, choosing new ones, and working to acquire those 
ends as new preferences is to that extent a process conducive to autonomy. As Elster says, 
‘there is a respectable and I believe valid doctrine that explains freedom in terms of the 
ability to accept and embrace the inevitable’ (1983, p.119). Elster’s view, however, is that the 
overwhelming majority of adaptive preferences are not formed in this explicit, deliberate and 
effortful manner. But the matter is not as black and white as he envisages. The person telling 
themselves to ‘grow up’ or ‘make the best of it’, burning their old photographs, or just 
marshalling the will to get out of the house is consciously shaping their ends, though this is a 
vast distance from the Stoic’s assiduous character-shaping. It is unclear why this level of 
awareness and determination is insufficient to begin attributions of autonomy in Elster’s 
sense and hence allow most instances of Hellenistic Adaptation to count pro tanto as 
autonomous.  
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In order to assess the second reason, we need to turn to one of the few major defenses of 
adaptive preferences in recent years, that of Donald Brucker. Brucker puts forward a test of 
subjunctive reflective endorsement: ‘an agent’s adaptive preference is rational provided that 
if she were to examine the preference, then she would endorse it upon reflection’ (2009, p. 
322). Brucker argues that, contrary to Elster, we should acknowledge a preference as rational, 
not if it was autonomously acquired, but if it could be ‘autonomously retained’ (2009, p. 
319). If an agent was to reflect on the preference in question, if he identified with that 
preference and his reasons for holding it, then he endorses it. In such a case, Brucker argues, 
it is a preference that is rightly ascribed to him and should carry normative weight; it is a 
genuine reason for action. Combined with the analysis of §3.1 above this means, provided 
that the preference-holder identifies with the pursuit of happiness as one of their worthwhile 
ongoing goals, that preferences forged on the basis of Hellenistic Adaptation will be 
reflectively endorsed. Since the overwhelming majority of people do in fact take their own 
happiness to be a genuine personal goal, then absent specific countervailing commitments 
(Brucker considers ambitions: 2009, p. 320), there should be a presumption that Hellenistic 
Adaptation is autonomous in this sense. 
The main instance where this will not hold true is when the Hellenistic Adaptation was in fact 
erroneous – when the pursuit of happiness that forged the new preference was itself wrong-
headed. Epictetus provides a possible example:  
Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of ‘mistresses’ by the men. 
Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men 
pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place ill their hopes. (1758, 
[40]) 
We may read this as young women allowing their preferences to adapt to what they perceive 
as a way that they can expect to be happy, but without being aware of their opportunities for 
happiness outside being objects of pleasure for men, or aware of the risks, limitations and 
transience of the happiness that being such an object in fact carries. The net result is that we 
can expect accurate and informed Hellenistic Adaptation, but not erroneous or misguided 
adaptation, to be reflectively endorsed and so autonomous in Brucker’s sense. 
Third, sometimes when we speak of autonomy we refer to the control a person has over their 
life – we are enquiring as to whether their life was one that they authored, or one authored by 
others. So it is worth on this footing noting that the Stoic (and to an extent the Epicurean: 
Mitsis, 1988, p. 88) reasons for Hellenistic Adaptation were not narrowly concerned with 
happiness, but also for control of one’s life. To desire something that is up to the whim of 
another is to make your happiness hostage to their favor. As Epictetus describes:  
He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that 
person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish 
nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others, else he must necessarily be 
a slave.6 
By having us take responsibility for our own happiness, Hellenistic Adaptation thus prevents 
others holding power over us.  
For these three reasons, Hellenistic Adaptation can be a key strategy in authoring our own 
lives and achieving autonomy. 
Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 12, no. 1 (2010) 
36 
 
4. The Capability Theorist’s objections  
Capability theorists like Nussbaum and Sen argue that adaptive preferences are a serious 
concern normatively and practically. On a normative level, adaptive preferences are an issue 
because, capability theorists contend, people – especially women – can be adapted to 
situations that are objectionable. Some political theories, including many forms of 
utilitarianism, will then take those adapted preferences as reasons not to change the 
objectionable state of affairs. This result, the capability theorists’ submit, is unacceptable, and 
it suggests that we should instead adopt an objective list of human goods or ‘capabilities’ 
(Sen, 1995, pp. 261-63). On a practical level, adaptive preferences are an issue because, says 
Nussbaum, in putting the objective list of goods…  
at the center of a normative political project aimed at providing the philosophical 
underpinning for basic political principles, we are going against not just other people's 
preferences about women, but, more controversially, against many preferences (or so 
it seems) of women about themselves and their lives. (2001, pp. 67-68) 
When we turn to the type of examples presented by these theorists however, what we find is 
that the problems are often not ones of changed preferences at all. The central culprits appear 
to be changed beliefs that, a) some particular preferences they hold are morally wrong, or, b) 
whatever preferences they do or might hold are normatively irrelevant, where this last has 
been created by either learned helplessness or moral indoctrination, or, more likely, a 
corrosive combination of the two. Nussbaum’s discussion of Vasanti, a woman in an abusive 
marriage, is representative: ‘Like many women, she seems to have thought that abuse was 
painful and bad, but, still, a part of women’s lot in life, just something women have to put up 
with as part of being a woman…’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 68). But contrary to Nussbaum’s 
position, Vasanti has not come to prefer the abuse; the state being reported is one where she 
hates it but accepts it as a moral and descriptive reality. The change reported is thus one of 
learned helplessness and learned worthlessness, not Hellenistic Adaptation. The two cases are 
sharply distinguished by the Epicurean, who contrasts the genuine acquisition of new 
preferences with resignation: ‘to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a 
pitiable thing’ (Cicero, 1883, 1:15). Sen’s examples similarly surround cases of real conflict 
of interests between women and men that are culturally effaced through various forms of 
social conditioning, especially the inculcation of moral belief (Sen, 1993, p. 261). Again, the 
culprits here are learned moral worthlessness and preference-targeting moral obloquy. Even 
without considering the issue of moral indoctrination, Teschl and Comim earlier came to a 
similar conclusion: the capability theorists’ analysis was not of adaptive preferences at all, 
but ‘should be more appropriately called analysis of resignation’ (2005, p. 242).  
Sometimes, to be sure, we find cases where changed preferences cause real political concerns 
– but when this occurs the font of the problem often lies in an accompanying changed belief, 
namely, that the newly formed preferences are objectively right. A woman can, I have 
argued, rationally and autonomously (in some important senses at least) have decided in the 
face of illiberal conditions that a working life is not what she prefers. But if she goes further 
and holds that, irrespective of changed political circumstances, a working life is objectively 
wrong for all women (including, say, her daughters) then she falls into Sour Grapes 
irrationality. The irrationality may be understandable, but it remains irrational.  
If this is right, then worries about adaptive preferences are substantially diminished. On a 
normative level, the utilitarian can accept a person’s preferences while rejecting their 
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concurrent beliefs that the preference is morally wrong or irrelevant (Baber, 2007, p. 124). 
Both those beliefs are, after all, contrary to what the utilitarian understands to be basic moral 
facts: that particular preferences are not of themselves wrong and that each person’s 
preferences must enter the moral calculus. On a practical level, certain problems are also 
mitigated. What the reformer needs to do is to use argument, evidence and illustration to 
show that the moral beliefs into which the person was indoctrinated were misplaced (indeed, 
in all likelihood, were manipulative and exploitative) or that the factual claims on which 
those beliefs were based were untrue. It is not, for instance, in the nature of things that 
women must remain uneducated and neglected, and moral conclusions based upon this 
flawed vision of the world should therefore be changed. But this task of consciousness-
raising can be done at the same time as accepting that the preferences the women currently 
hold might be genuine and autonomous reflections of who they are, and of their admirably 
taking charge of their own lives and happiness within the action-space open to them.  
5. Further Political Applications 
The broad conclusion arising from the foregoing arguments is that preferences formed on the 
basis of Hellenistic Adaptation warrant respect. They are normative for the person who holds 
them, in the sense that they provide him or her with genuine, rational and autonomous 
reasons for action. And they are for these reasons normatively relevant in guiding others’ 
moral actions, whether this means being included in utilitarian calculations or allowing space 
for their operation in the shaping of rights and consent.  
In what follows I want to draw two further, more specific, conclusions. 
5.1 Respect for the formation of expectations 
If the capacity to perform Hellenistic Adaptation is indeed a key tool used by each person in 
the pursuit of their happiness, autonomy and objective human goods, then political 
institutions have strong reasons to make Hellenistic Adaptation a genuine possibility. At a 
minimum, this requires that citizens can form accurate, stable expectations about their 
entitlements and the results of their activities. When we form favorable expectations for the 
future, Hellenistic Adaptation has our desires for those results strengthen (Bentham, 1781, pp. 
48-49). We deem ourselves rationally justified in allowing our desires to extend to these 
results, because we expect them to obtain. In desiring these results we do not, we think, 
threaten our happiness or future freedom. When our expectations are based not only on 
evidence but on social mores and laws about the consequences of actions, then they attain 
additional force again – we feel socially legitimated in extending our desires into those 
expectations. At minimum then, we have a further reason, beyond well-known concerns 
regarding procedural fairness and coordination, that political regimes should obey the rule of 
law.  
The philosopher who placed expectations at the heart of the political project was Jeremy 
Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and his reasons for doing so were very much centered 
on the significance of expectations for happiness. We must consider that man is, he tells us, 
‘susceptible of pains and pleasures by anticipation; and that it is not enough to secure him 
from actual loss, but it is necessary also to guarantee him, as far as possible, against future 
loss’ (1978, p. 50). For this reason – to diminish the pains of present fear and future 
disappointment – the law must be structured around the establishing and protecting of 
expectations (1978, p. 51). In my terms, the law must recognize the significance of 
Hellenistic Adaptation to personal happiness, and be crafted with this in mind. It is this that 
Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 12, no. 1 (2010) 
38 
 
explains, I think, what Jeremy Waldron (1999) calls the ‘normative resilience of property’ – 
the nervousness that is felt when property is suddenly redistributed even when we are 
confident about the abstract justice of doing so. The person losing the property is not only 
suffering disappointment, but disappointment of those preferences that it was in a deep sense 
appropriate – rationally and socially – for the person to come to hold. 
5.2 Respect for consent, but not for distribution of political resources and opportunities 
In §3.3 I argued that a person may endorse their adaptive preferences because they were 
formed as part of a rational pursuit of happiness. However, the same reasoning process does 
not justify that preference being used in a social decision-making process governing, for 
instance, the distribution of future opportunities. What made the preference rational and so 
autonomous for the person was that, given the surrounding circumstances and her beliefs 
about them, it would further her happiness to have it. This provides little reason to believe 
that another person, who is not or may not be similarly placed, should rationally or 
autonomously choose to cultivate that preference. To presume that it would falls afoul of 
Sour Grapes irrationality – we move fallaciously from the true claim that it was not wise for 
me to desire δ to the false (or at least unsupported) claim that δ is in fact not desirable. This 
result dovetails with and further supports a common position taken with regard to adaptive 
preferences – that they supply genuine reasons for a person to give or withhold consent about 
what happens to her, but fail to supply good reasons for a person to justifiably allocate 
resources or opportunities to others (Walker, 1995, 463-69; Nussbaum, 2001, p. 86). The 
‘rightness’ of any individual holding particular adaptive preferences should not make us think 
it is ‘right’ simpliciter that all individuals hold those preferences. 
6. Conclusion 
In the literature on adaptive preferences, it is sometimes noted that citizens of poorer 
countries have a ‘rugged cheerfulness’ about them. Far from bemoaning this trait and seeking 
to extirpate it, I submit that citizens of the developed world should consider learning from it. 
The developed world offers many of us vastly greater opportunities, choices, experiences, 
living-standards, longevity and real wealth than previous generations could have imagined. 
When the virtue that is Hellenistic Adaptation is not merely forgotten or suppressed, but is 
actively disparaged by our political thinking, then we as a culture lose hold of the very insight 
that allows freedom and welfare to translate into lived happiness.7 
Notes 
1 On the reasons for this characterisation of the psychological state, see Baber, 2007, pp. 107, 
124-25. 
2 E.g. Walker, 1995, pp. 464-65; Brucker, 2009, p. 313; Nussbaum, 2001 p. 78; Sunstein, 
1991, p. 21. 
3 Epictetus, 1758, [2]. See similarly: Bentham, 1978, p. 50; Brennan, 2003, pp. 272-73; Long, 
2006, p. 387. 
4 Epictetus, 1758, [12]; Epicurus, 1957a, p. 30, Bentham, 1978, p. 51, Cicero, 1883, 1:18. 
5 Epicurus, 1957a, p. 31; See similarly Epicurus, 1957b, p. 35; Cicero 1883, 1:11; Mitsis, 
1988, p. 35; Smith 2006, p. 143 
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6 Epictetus, 1758, [14]; See similarly Aurelius, 2006, pp. 29, 49; Smith, 2006, pp. 48-55; 
Long, 2006, p. 380. 
7 I am indebted to helpful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee for the 
AJPAE, and to discussants at the AAPAE 2010 Conference, where an earlier version of this 
paper was presented. 
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